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A SOCIAL HISTORY OF KNOWLEDGE: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES*
Peter Burke1
 Ten years ago I published a book about the social history of knowledge in Europe from Gutenberg 
to Diderot, in other words from the invention of printing until the publication of the French Encyclopédie 
that Diderot edited, a book in many volumes that was not only a collective presentation of what was known 
at the time but also an instrument in the service of the Enlightenment.2 
I
My interest in a social history of knowledge goes back to the 1960s, when I discovered the sociology of 
knowledge, more especially the work of the Hungarian Karl Mannheim, who was writing on the subject in the 
1920s and 1930s.3 However, it was only when I was invited to give a series of lectures in the Netherlands, in 
the 1990s, that I thought of writing a book on this theme. The lectures, given at the University of Groningen, 
were intended for everyone there, not only for the students and teachers of the department of history. 
For this reason I adopted an explicitly interdisciplinary approach, with lectures, which later became 
chapters on the economics of knowledge, politics of knowledge, geography of knowledge, anthropology 
and sociology of knowledge, looking at Europe from the 15th to the 18th century.
After I revised the lectures and published them in book form in the year 2000, I turned to other things, 
at least most of the time. The problem is that after you publish a book, you are often asked to lecture on the 
subject of that book, even though by that you have turned to another topic, sometimes a very different topic. 
Requests of this kind are invitations to revisit one’s past, to go back 10 or even 20 or 30 years. 
In any case, the history of knowledge suddenly became a hot or fashionable topic around the year 
2000, I am not sure why, probably an effect of current debates about the ‘knowledge society’ or ‘information 
society’ of our own time. As a result I have been asked to speak about knowledge at more conferences in 
more places than I can easily remember. 
Thanks to these invitations and the encounters that follow with people in different parts of the globe 
who share my interest in the history of knowledge, I hope to produce a revised and enlarged edition of 
*O texto apresentado é uma síntese da conferência “História Social do Conhecimento”, proferida no XII Seminário 
Internacional de Educação promovido pela Universidade Feevale - junho de 2010.
1 Doutor pela Universidade de Oxford. Atualmente, é professor emérito da Universidade de Cambridge. Foi professor de 
História das Idéias na School of European Studies da Universidade de Essex e professor da Universidade de Princeton.
2 Peter Burke, The Social History of Knowledge from Gutenberg to Diderot, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, Portuguese 
translation Uma História Social do Conhecimento, Rio, Zahar, 2003.
3 Karl Mannheim, Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge, London, Routledge, 1952; id., Conservatism: a Contribution to 
the Sociology of Knowledge (1927) English translation London, Routledge, 1986.
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my book before very long. However, I have already 
begun a more ambitious project. 
As you know, historians usually specialize a 
single period in the past. For 40 years my job, at the 
universities of Sussex and Cambridge, was to teach 
the history of Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. 
On retirement I felt a strange sense of freedom: 
freedom to study whatever I wanted, to write about 
whatever I wanted. I began by turning to the history 
of Brazil in the 20th century and writing a book, 
together with my wife, about Gilberto Freyre.4 
When that book was finished, I began thinking 
again about the history of knowledge. What 
happened after the publication of the great French 
Encyclopédie? How did we get from the middle of 
the 18th century to the current state of knowledge? I 
didn’t know of any single book that tried to answer 
that question. So I decided to write one myself, a 2nd 
volume on the history of knowledge, ranging this 
time from around 1750 to the year 2000 or even 
later. 
The title of the new book will be ‘A social 
history of knowledge from the Encyclopédie to 
Wikipedia’. I have not yet finished writing this book 
but what I should like to do now is to share with you 
a few ideas about the approach I have adopted and 
the problems that have arisen.
This second volume is not organized like the 
first one, according to approaches from different 
disciplines such as geography, anthropology and so 
on. The changes that have taken place since 1750 
have been so rapid that I felt the need to say less about 
structures in the 2nd volume in order to say more 
about trends: secularization, commercialization, 
specialization, professionalization, democratization, 
mechanization and so on. 
Trends such as these have not only been 
rapid but also profound, affecting our everyday 
relation to knowledge. For this reason the new 
book will begin with four chapters on activities 
that might at first sight seem to be timeless. In the 
first place, gathering knowledge (an odd metaphor 
that suggests that knowledge grows on trees, but a 
convenient one). Secondly, the process of analysing 
4 Peter Burke and Maria Lúcia G. Pallares-Burke, Social 
Theory in the Tropics: Gilberto Freyre, Oxford, Peter 
Lang, 2008, Portuguese trans. Repensando os trôpicos: 
Gilberto Freyre, S. Paulo, UNESP, 2009.
the knowledge that has been collected. Thirdly, 
disseminating knowledge more widely. In the fourth 
place, employing knowledge for various purposes, 
economic, political and so on. 
What I try to show in the book is that these four 
processes or activities have changed in important 
respects over the last 250 years, thanks in particular 
to changes in technology but for other reasons as 
well. 
Another three chapters are concerned with 
what I like to call the three dimensions of the history 
of knowledge, as of history in general: chronology, 
geography and sociology. 
1. Chronology. When did the main changes 
happen? When, for instance, did the globalization 
of knowledge begin? Or the rise of the so-called 
knowledge economy’ or ‘knowledge society’? Was 
it 20 years ago? Was it 50 years ago? Or was it a 
hundred years ago or more? The changes that have 
taken place in the last generation, the last 20 or 
30 years, have certainly been important, but like a 
historian, especially a historian who used to work 
on a more remote period, I try to view these changes 
in the perspective of developments over the long 
term, especially the last century or two.
2. Turning to geography, where did the main 
changes happen? Where were the centres and the 
peripheries of knowledge in different periods? Since 
the late 18th century, it has been possible to observe 
the rise and fall of a number of intellectual as well 
as political hegemonies: first the French, then the 
German, the English and finally the North American.
3. Turning now to sociology: What kinds of 
people, individuals and groups, and what kinds of 
institution made the changes or experienced the 
changes?
It is time to say something about the problems 
that have arisen, problems of the kind that necessarily 
arise in the course of writing a book of this kind. 
Let me begin from the fact that two of the three 
main words in the title of the book are problematic: 
‘social’ and ‘knowledge’ itself.
II
‘Social’ is or was a fashionable adjective, 
used in the titles of many books. In the case of the 
history of knowledge there are recent books on the 
social history of naturalists, the ‘social history of 
cartography’, the social history of archaeology, the 
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social history of anthropology and the social history 
of medicine. 
What is the point of that adjective? In my view, 
a social history of knowledge in a given period is 
not the same thing as a general intellectual history 
of the period. It is a contribution to that history with 
particular emphases, both negative and positive. 
To begin with a negative point. A social history 
of knowledge, in my view, should deliberately 
avoid what might be called the heroic interpretation 
of the history of knowledge as the history of great 
discoverers or thinkers. Famous individuals such as 
Voltaire or Darwin certainly made a contribution, 
but so did many other people, lesser figures who do 
not always receive the credit they deserve. 
A leading sociologist of science, the North 
American Robert Merton, has pointed out that the 
achievements of minor figures are often attributed 
by posterity to better-known major figures such as 
Newton or Einstein. Merton called this tendency 
‘the Matthew effect’, thinking of the passage from 
the Gospel of St Matthew in which it says ‘to him 
who hath shall be given’.5 A psychologist would say 
that memory is always selective and that we tend to 
attach information to names that we already know. 
A sociologist might add that memory is socially 
selective, that we attach information to the names 
of people like us.
For this reason a feminist historian of science 
has argued that we should speak of the ‘Matilda 
Effect’ because the forgotten scientists or other 
scholars are often women.6 For example, the credit 
for the famous discovery of the structure of DNA has 
gone to Francis Crick and James Watson rather than 
to Rosalind Franklin, who also made an important 
contribution to the collective discovery. Ironically 
enough, the idea of the Matthew Effect is a case of 
the Matilda Effect, since Merton did not give much 
credit to his research assistant, Harriet Zuckerman, 
whom he subsequently married!
In any case, many advances in knowledge 
have been the result of the work not of isolated 
individuals but of small groups, whether they were 
face-to-face groups such as research teams working 
5 Robert K. Merton (1968) ‘The Matthew Effect in Science’, 
Science 159 (1968), 56-63.
6 Margaret W. Rossiter, ‘The Matthew/Matilda Effect in 
Science’, Social Studies of Science 23 (1993), 325-41.
in laboratories or a network of individuals who 
kept in touch by means of visits, letters, telephone 
or more recently by e-mail. Collaboration has an 
important place in the history of knowledge. We 
should not forget competition between groups, 
which has often stimulated discovery. Crick and 
Watson saw themselves as taking part in a race with 
competitors such as Linus Pauling.7
Let me now turn to the positive aspects of 
the social approach to knowledge, two aspects in 
particular.
In the first place, following early sociologists of 
knowledge such as Karl Mannheim as well as more 
recent ones, the book I am writing emphasizes the 
fact that knowledge is situated. In other words, that 
knowledge is gathered, analysed, communicated and 
used in particular social or cultural environments. 
For example, a recent or at any rate a recently-
named approach to the history of science is 
described by the scholars who practice it as the 
‘urban history of science’, viewing cities as centres 
of the storage of knowledge about the natural world, 
as centres of calculation, and as nodes or staging-
posts in international flows of information.8 This 
approach can obviously be extended to knowledge 
in general.
What is discovered may be presented as a 
universal truth, it may even be a universal truth. All 
the same, the discovery itself always happens in a 
particular place, at a particular time and within a 
particular social group, and is affected and may even 
be distorted by these circumstances. The passage 
from the local to the general cannot be taken for 
granted, it requires analysis.9
The effects of the social situation may weigh 
more heavily on discoveries in the humanities than 
in the case of the natural sciences. All the same, 
no one can escape being situated. The situation 
influences what a give individual or group is 
interested in, what people are looking for, what they 
consider a good explanation, and so on.
7 James D. Watson, The Double Helix: a personal account 
of the discovery of the structure of DNA, London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.
8 Antonella Romano and Stéphane Van Damme (eds.) 
Sciences et villes-mondes, 16e-18e siècles, special issue, 
Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine 55 (2008).
9 Jan Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge (1998), 2nd 
edn Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
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Scholars are often imagined as sitting in ivory 
towers (including laboratories), remote from the 
world. They certainly need ‘a space of their own’, 
free from the immediate pressures of everyday life, 
in which to observe or to think. All the same, this 
remoteness is relative and incomplete. Scholars 
take the world, including its politics, into the tower 
with them. Conversely their results emerge from the 
tower into the open and are used by other people to 
change the world. 
The second positive point that I should like 
to make about a social history of knowledge, 
distinguishing it from other histories of knowledge, 
is that it focuses on institutions such as universities, 
archives, libraries, laboratories, observatories, 
hospitals, think tanks and so on. 
When I began writing this second volume, 
I was worried about not being able to understand 
scientific theories such as relativity or quantum 
physics. I still don’t understand these theories but 
I have become less anxious. The point is that the 
focus of a social history is not on theories of this 
kind so much as on the places in which theorists 
worked, like the Institute for Advanced Study 
at Princeton in the case of Einstein. For a social 
historian, it is necessary to discover how and why 
these institutions were founded, how they were 
funded, how they are distributed over the globe and 
whether the administrators try to guide the research.
Institutions are also important in the history 
of knowledge as centres of intellectual practices 
such as taking notes, making maps, conversing or 
debating about research. These practices may seem 
to be timeless. In fact, as I suggested earlier, they 
vary according to periods, places, kinds of research 
and not least according to the kinds of institution in 
which research takes place. 
III
Let me turn to the 2nd problem raised by the 
title of my book, the most fundamental problem, 
what is knowledge? Knowledge and information are 
often distinguished. We are warned, for instance, 
that we may become ‘information giants’ but that 
we also risk becoming ‘knowledge dwarfs’. Again, 
‘We are drowning in information but starved of 
knowledge’. 
Information, like ‘data’ is often viewed as 
raw material. Let me continue the metaphor and 
describe the processing of raw information as a 
kind of cooking that transforms it into knowledge. 
‘Cooking’ in this sense includes a number of different 
processes such as testing (replicating experiments, 
checking sources), analysis, calculation, comparison 
and systematization. Cooking also includes the 
process of transforming tacit or implicit knowledge 
into explicit knowledge, or local knowledge into 
generalizations with a wider, perhaps universal 
validity.
One of the main tendencies in the development 
of knowledge in the last 250 years, so I believe, is 
what the Germans call Verwissenschaftlichung, 
sometimes translated into English as ‘scientification. 
Actually I prefer the term ‘academization’ to 
describe the double process of the appropriation and 
systematization of local or indigenous or popular or 
craft knowledge, especially in universities from the 
later 18th century onwards. 
Academic chemistry, for instance, developed 
out of the practices of apothecaries, academic 
geology out of the practices of miners, and academic 
biology out of the practices of farmers, breeding 
plants and animals. Botany developed out of the 
practical knowledge of gardeners and herbalists and 
the famous classification system of Linnaeus was 
indebted to popular taxonomies. Again, professional 
doctors appropriated remedies from the practice of 
their rivals, the unorthodox, alternative or irregular 
healers. 
It was a similar story in the humanities. 
Academic economics drew on the practical 
knowledge of merchants, academic anthropology 
on the knowledge of missionaries and colonial 
officials, and academic demography and statistics 
on the practical knowledge of actuaries. I am not 
denying that the academics added value to what they 
appropriated. Systematization is useful. The point 
I want to make is that founders of new academic 
disciplines do not start from zero.
I have been speaking about ‘knowledge’ 
in the singular but I must confess that I remain 
uncomfortable with this idea. It is more illuminating 
to think of knowledges as we have come to think 
of cultures, in the plural. Explicit and implicit 
knowledges, for instance: practical and theoretical, 
pure and applied, local and general, knowing how 
and knowing that.
My own study centres on academic 
knowledges in the West, but it will not examine 
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these knowledges in isolation. On the contrary, 
I shall discuss some non-academic knowledges, 
those of the secret services for instance, as well as 
the encounter between western and indigenous 
knowledges in the Ottoman Empire, China, Japan 
and elsewhere. This focus on the academic world in 
the West does not imply the belief that these are the 
only important knowledges, only my fear that this 
enterprise of synthesis is already ambitious enough. 
IV
The first three chapters of the book, concerned 
as they are with the processes of gathering, 
analysing and disseminating knowledge, record a 
great collective achievement, sometimes described 
as a ‘knowledge explosion’. Much more is known 
by human beings today than was known in the 
time of Diderot – about different cultures, about the 
world of nature, about the universe. The collective 
enterprise of analysis has also produced impressive 
results such as the theory of relativity or the structure 
of DNA. Knowledge has been disseminated more 
and more rapidly and more and more widely than 
ever before, to different parts of the world and to 
different social groups. 
I have no wish to deny any of these achievements 
but the purpose of the book is not to celebrate them. 
My aim is to write history, especially what might 
be called ‘polyphonic’ history, in other words a 
history that allows different voices to be heard and 
presents the past from different points of view. To 
write history in this way means asking, among other 
questions, whether major achievements have costs 
as well as benefits. 
A triumphalist history of knowledge or indeed 
of anything else misses these costs. A polyphonic 
history, on the other hand, will find a place not only 
for knowledge but also for its opposite, the history 
of ignorance. Ignorance is a topic that was itself 
ignored by scholars until just a few years ago. It has 
recently become an object of interest, especially to 
sociologists and historians of science. In English, this 
new topic has been christened ‘agnotology’ while in 
German it is known more simply as Nicht-Wissen.10
10 Stefan Böschen and Peter Wehling (eds.) Wissenschaft 
zwischen Folgenverantwortung und Nichtwissen. 
Aktuelle Perspektiven der Wissenschaftsforschung, 
Wiesbaden, Westdeutscher Verlag, 2004; Robert N. 
So what are the costs that have accompanied 
the benefits of the recent knowledge explosion? In 
the first place, there are the costs of specialization. 
We should be ambivalent about specialization. On 
the one hand, it is obviously useful, offering as it 
does the advantages of the division of labour. The 
more knowledge is gathered, the more we need 
specialists or experts in different kinds of knowledge 
or knowledges. 
On the other hand, specialization is dangerous 
because it narrows the mind. As a result of 
specialization, humanity knows more today, 
collectively, than ever before. Individually, on the 
other hand, we are in danger of knowing less and 
especially of understanding less, failing to see the 
big picture and the connections between different 
knowledges.
A polyphonic history of knowledge must also 
include what has been lost as well as what has 
been gained over the centuries. Think for example 
of the destruction of libraries or archives (such as 
the records of slavery in Brazil destroyed in 1890 
by order of the minister Ruy Barbosa). Think of 
the destruction of indigenous knowledges or local 
knowledges over the centuries in the course of 
colonization, especially colonization from Europe 
– the knowledge of medicinal herbs, for instance.
Think too of the extinction of languages. 
Today, about six thousand languages are spoken 
in different parts of the world. A survey made in 
1999 estimated that 96% of these languages were 
spoken by only 4% of the population, that ‘nearly 
five hundred languages have less than a hundred 
speakers’. As a result it is likely that three thousand 
languages will become extinct by the year 2100, a 
reduction of 50% in the course of a century.11
Think too of the process of hiding knowledge, 
withdrawing it from circulation by classifying it as 
secret, inaccessible to anyone who does not work 
for the FBI or MI5 or the NKVD. Take the case of 
the ‘naukograds’ in Soviet Russia. These ‘knowledge 
cities’ - so-called because scientific research was 
carried out there - were not marked on published 
Proctor and Londa Schiebinger (eds.) Agnotology: the 
making and unmaking of ignorance, Stanford, Stanford 
Universaity Press, 2008.
11 David Crystal, LANGUAGE DEATH, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002.
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maps. Their existence was officially denied, as well 
as the knowledge produced there.12 
Another method of hiding knowledge is to 
disseminate false knowledge, an old practice which 
has recently acquired a new name, ‘disinformation’. 
In the USSR, for instance, some maps deliberately 
showed towns in the wrong places as a defence 
against foreign spying. 
Another way of losing knowledge is to discard 
it, to throw it away. Ever since the invention of 
printing, libraries have been growing at an alarming 
rate – alarming, that is, from a librarian’s point 
of view. Finding space for what librarians call 
‘accessions’ becomes more and more difficult all 
the time. Some librarians choose to ‘de-accession’ 
books, a euphemism for throwing them away. 
Others simply banish what they regard as the less 
useful books to remote parts of the library, to storage 
rooms in cellars or elsewhere. A study of the books 
that a major library has rejected in this way over the 
centuries might reveal a good deal about intellectual 
history. It would be a kind of archaeology, digging 
below the surface.
Equally revealing, and somewhat easier to carry 
out, would be a similar investigation of the history 
of encyclopaedias. As knowledge has increased, 
encyclopaedias have become larger and larger. All 
the same, a comparison of successive editions of the 
same encyclopaedia, such as the French Larousse, 
the German Brockhaus or the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, shows that editors and contributors 
discard a great deal of old material in the process 
of bringing the book up to date. For this reason, 
for certain purposes scholars often prefer the 11th 
edition of the Britannica (published in 1911) to all 
the later versions.
There are obviously practical reasons for some 
of the omissions, the need to save paper or space. 
However, in the world of knowledge on line, the 
world of Google and Wikipedia this problem is much 
less acute. Even so, ‘Someone recently proposed a 
Wikimorgue … We could call it the Deletopedia’.13
We are entitled to suspect that there is a 
12 Georgii Lappo and Pavel Polian, ‘Naoukograds, les 
villes interdites’, in Christian Jacob (ed., 2007) Les lieux 
de savoir, Paris, Albin Michel, 1226-49.
13 Nicholson Baker, ‘The Charms of Wikipedia’, New 
York Review of Books, 20 March 2008.
philosophy underlying the discarding of knowledge. 
This philosophy is a more or less naïf belief in 
progress, as if the latest ideas are always the best. 
In any case, a thorough study of what is thrown 
out or thrown away in each edition of a given 
encyclopaedia would surely tell us something about 
changing values, especially because these works 
of reference shape our ideas as well as expressing 
them. They are not only our servants but also our 
masters.
It has often been observed that historians are 
generally prejudiced in favour of winners. In order to 
understand the past we surely need to pay attention 
to the losers as well, to reconstruct what a Mexican 
historian has called the ‘vision of the vanquished’. 
Trotsky once described the losers as consigned 
to ‘the dustbin of history’. It is well-known that 
successive editions of the Soviet Encyclopaedia 
removed references to people, ideas and things that 
had come to be officially regarded as politically 
incorrect, including of course Trotsky himself after 
his break with Stalin.
For cultural historians, to ignore the ideas of the 
losers is, in the traditional English phrase, to throw 
out the baby with the bath-water. Losers, including 
disciplines that are now regarded as ‘pseudo-
sciences’, from astrology to ‘parapsychology’, will 
have their place in the polyphonic history that I am 
trying to write.
